Teague
Language from Teague that explains why they did not reach whether this new fair cross-section requirement would be recognized (which I really should have included in the materials) :
After stating on 184 in the materials that this proposed new rule did not satisfy the Teague exceptions, the Court said:
"Were we to recognize the new rule urged by petitioner in this case, we would have to give petitioner the benefit of that new rule even though it would not be applied retroactively to others similarly situated."
They added "If there were no other way to avoid rendering advisory opinions, we might well agree that the inequitable treatment described above is 'an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making.'” But there is a more principled way of dealing with the problem. We can simply refuse to announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case and to all others similarly situated"...
"We think this approach is a sound one. Not only does it eliminate any problems of rendering advisory opinions, it also avoids the inequity resulting from the uneven application of new rules to similarly situated defendants. We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated. Because a decision extending the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review under the approach we adopt today, we do not address petitioner's claim."
After stating on 184 in the materials that this proposed new rule did not satisfy the Teague exceptions, the Court said:
"Were we to recognize the new rule urged by petitioner in this case, we would have to give petitioner the benefit of that new rule even though it would not be applied retroactively to others similarly situated."
They added "If there were no other way to avoid rendering advisory opinions, we might well agree that the inequitable treatment described above is 'an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making.'” But there is a more principled way of dealing with the problem. We can simply refuse to announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case and to all others similarly situated"...
"We think this approach is a sound one. Not only does it eliminate any problems of rendering advisory opinions, it also avoids the inequity resulting from the uneven application of new rules to similarly situated defendants. We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated. Because a decision extending the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review under the approach we adopt today, we do not address petitioner's claim."
posted by Prof. Garrett at 2:26 PM
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